AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW TYPES OF CROSS-NATIONAL RESEARCH
The broadest possible definition of crossnational research is any research that transcends national boundaries. This definition is somewhat ambiguous, though, because many studies of single societies are implicitly cross-national, in that the investigators interpret their findings by contrasting what they learn about the country they actually study with what is known or is believed to be true about some other country or countries. I prefer to restrict the term, crossnational, to studies that are explicitly comparative, that is, studies that utilize systematically comparable data from two or more nations.
In restricting the term to explicitly comparative studies, I do not mean to belittle the importance of studies that are only implicitly comparative. Such studies contribute importantly to our understanding; witness, for example, the distinguished series of studies of American society by foreign observers, beginning with Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in America. Consider, too, studies in which the selection of some one country is particularly appropriate for testing a general proposition-as in Kelley Bunker's (1985) Underdeveloping the Amazon is a particularly good example-where some country or region of a country is selected for study precisely because it exemplifies a more general social phenomenon. I leave such research out of my purview not because it is unimportant, but because to include it would make the bounds of "cross-national" so large and ambiguous that it would be difficult to say what, other than research focused single-mindedly on a particular country, is not cross-national.
Within the large genre of research that is explicitly comparative, I would further distinguish four types of cross-national research of somewhat differing intent. The four types are those in which nation is object of study; those in which nation is context of study; those in which nation is unit of analysis; and those that are transnational in character.2 Although these four types of research shade into one another, their purposes are distinguishable and their theoretical implications somewhat different. My analysis will apply mainly to the second of the four types, in which nation is context of study.
In the first type of cross-national research, where nations are the object of study, the investigator's interest is primarily in the particular countries studied: how Germany compares to the United States, France to the Soviet Union, or India to Pakistan. Alternatively, the investigator may be interested in comparing particular institutions in these countries: the social security systems of the U.S. and Australia; the educational systems of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. At their best, as in the systematic comparisons of Finland and Poland by Erik Allardt, Wlodzimierz Wesolowski, and their collaborators (1978), such studies can lead to well-informed interpretations that apply far beyond the particular countries studied. What distinguishes such research, though, is its primary interest in understanding the particular countries. In this research, one wants to know about Finland and Poland for their own sakes; the investigator does not select them for study just because they happen to be useful settings for pursuing some general hypothesis.
By contrast, I wish to focus on cross-national studies in which, to borrow from Erwin Scheuch's (1967) apt phrase, nation is context. In such research, one is primarily interested in testing the generality of findings and interpretations about how certain social institutions operate or about how certain aspects of social structure impinge on personality. In Burawoy and Lukacs' (1987) comparison of a U.S. machine shop with a Hungarian machine shop, for example, their primary interest is not in the United States and Hungary for their own sakes, nor certainly in the particular machine shops, but in these machine shops as exemplifying the relative efficiency of capitalist and socialist industrial enterprises. Admittedly, it may be difficult to differentiate research in which nation is object from research in which nation is context. When Robin Williams (1985) studies the use of threats in US/USSR relations, he 2 I make no claim that this classification is theoretically superior to other classifications of cross-national research, only that it serves my analytic purposes better than others do. Compared to Tilly's (1984) well-known classification, my "nation as object" category corresponds roughly to his "individualizing comparisons;" my "nation as context" category encompasses both his "universalizing" and his "variation-finding compari- clearly is interested in the US and the USSR both for their own sakes and as exemplifying superpowers in a nuclear age; there is no way of separating the two purposes. It is nevertheless generally useful to distinguish between research whose primary purpose is to tell us more about the particular countries studied and research whose primary purpose is to use these countries as the vehicle for investigating the contexts in which social institutions operate. My examination of cross-national research as an analytic strategy will be addressed mainly to research where nation is context. This domain includes such diverse studies as Theda Skocpol's (1979) Research that treats nations as the unit of analysis requires that one be able to discern which of the many differences between countries are the pertinent analytic variables; that one be able to formulate meaningful hypotheses at the appropriate level of abstraction; and-if one is ever to test such interpretations-that one have at hand or have the potential to collect data from a sizable sample of countries. It also requires much better data than are generally available in multination data sources. I hope that an essay on cross-national research written ten or twenty years from now will be able to focus much more on such research than I believe is warranted today.
And then, finally, there are studies that treat nations as components of larger international systems. Borrowing a term from economists and political scientists who have studied corpora- I see all four types of cross-national inquiry as useful, each for particular substantive problems. I focus on research that uses nation as context, not because I consider this type of cross-national research inherently more valuable than the others, but because I think that for many sociological problems-particularly, I must admit, for those in which I have the greatest substantive interest-this type of research has especially great utility in the present state of knowledge. In particular, such research affords the opportunity to study each of the countries with sufficient thoroughness for intensive comparison.
ESTABLISHING THE GENERALITY OF RELATIONSHIPS AND THE LIMITS OF GENERALITY
Many discussions of cross-national research (Ragin and Zaret [1983] is a thoughtful example) contrast two research strategies-one that looks for statistical regularities, another that searches for cultural or historical differences. I prefer to pose the distinction, not in terms of research strategies, nor of methodological preferences, nor even of theoretical proclivities toward "transhistorical" generalizations or "historically contextualized knowledge," but in terms of interpreting the two basic types of research findings-similarities and differences. Granted, investigators' theoretical and methodological preferences make it more or less likely that they will discover cross-national similarities; granted, too, what can be treated as a similarity at one level of analysis can be thought of as a myriad of differences at more detailed levels of analysis. Still, the critical issue is how to interpret similarities, and how to interpret differences, when you find them.
Finding cross-national similarities greatly extends the scope of sociological knowledge. Moreover, cross-national similarities lend themselves readily to sociological interpretation; cross-national differences are much more difficult to interpret. As Kazimierz Slomczynski, Joanne Miller, and I argued (albeit a little too categorically) in our first comparative analysis of the United States and Poland:
Insofar as cross-national analyses of social structure and personality yield similar findings in the countries studied, our interpretation can ignore whatever differences there may be in the cultures, political and economic systems, and historical circumstances of the particular countries, to deal instead with social-structural universals. But when the relationships between social structure and personality differ from country to country, then we must look to what is idiosyncratic about the particular countries for our interpretation. (1981, p. 740)
The first half of this formulation asserts that when the relationship between social structure and personality is the same in two or more countries, then the unique historical experiences of each country, their distinctive cultures, and their particular political systems are not of focal importance for interpreting the relationship. The formulation does not assert that history, culture, and political context have been irrelevant in shaping social structures, but that the resultant social structures have a cross-nationally consistent impact on people. The explanation of this impact should be sought in terms of how people experience the resultant social structures, rather than in the historical or cultural processes that shaped those structures. Admittedly, this may not always be the best interpretive strategy. Apparent similarities can mask profound differences; what seems to call for a unitary interpretation may actually require entirely different explanations. Nevertheless, I believe that where we find cross-national similarities, the most efficient strategy in searching for an explanation is to focus on what is structurally similar in the countries being compared, not on the often divergent historical processes that produced these social-structural similarities. The basic and very simple point is that socialstructural similarities may have been brought about by very different historical processes and yet have essentially similar social and psychological consequences.
The second half of the formulation directs us to interpret cross-national differences in terms of historical, cultural, political, or economic idiosyncrasies. Przeworski and Teune (1970) argued that what appear to be cross-national differences may really be instances of lawful regularities, if thought of in terms of some larger, more encompassing interpretation. I agree, but I also believe that developing such interpretations is an immensely difficult task. A necessary first step is to try to discover which of the many differences in history, culture, and political or economic systems that distinguish any two countries are pertinent to explaining the differences we find in their social structures or in how these social structures affect people's lives. I do not contend that cross-national differences cannot be lawfully explained-quite the contrary-but only that the lawful explanation of cross-national differences requires more explicit consideration of historical, cultural, and politicaleconomic particularities than does the lawful explanation of cross-national similarities.
Ultimately, the distinction between crossnational similarities and differences breaks down, and the issues cannot be so simply and neatly dichotomized. Nonetheless, it is a useful way to think about these issues. Therefore, I shall discuss the two types of cross-national research findings separately, beginning with cross-national similarities. I use the U.S.-Polish and U.S.-Japanese comparisons that my collaborators and I have carried out as my principal illustrations of both cross-national similarities and differences, my substantive concern in this part of the essay being the relationship between social structure and personality.3 The conclusions I draw are by no means limited to this substantive area. In the absence of appropriate cross-national evidence, though, there would be no way of knowing whether this (or any other) interpretation applies outside the particular historical, cultural, and political contexts of the United States. No analyses based solely on U.S. data could tell us whether the relationships between social stratification and personality are an 3 My concern is not with cross-national similarities or differences in personality but with cross-national similarities or differences in the relationship between social structure and personality. I do not believe that current methods are adequate for assessing whether Poles are more or less intellectually flexible than are Americans, or whether Japanese value self-direction more or less highly than do Americans. Methodological experts whom I greatly respect disagree with this judgment. They believe that if you construct confirmatory factor-analytic models of the same concept for representative samples of two countries, using not only the same indicators of the concept, but also the same reference indicator to establish the metric in both countries, you can compare, e.g., the mean level of authoritarian conservatism for U.S. and Polish adults (Schoenberg 1982 ). This assumes not only an exact equivalence of meaning, an issue about which confirmatory factor analysis does give us considerable confidence, but also exact equivalence in the frames of reference that people employ in answering questions. I doubt, though, that "strongly disagree" has the same connotations in a Polish interview as in an American interview; the survey specialists of the Polish Academy of Sciences believe that it is difficult for Polish respondents to overcome their cultural tendency to be polite to their guest, the interviewer. We do not have a zero-point for our scales, nor any other basis for mean comparisons. This, however, in no way prevents us from accurately assessing whether, for example, the relationship between social stratification and authoritarian beliefs is of the same sign and of roughly the same magnitude for the United Sates, Poland, and Japan. And this, I believe, is in any case the more important question for cross-national analysis. reasons, in all industrialized societies. Admittedly, negative evidence from research in any industrialized society would require a modification of this hypothesis or a restriction of its generality. Admittedly, too, the interpretation speaks only to existing societies. We can say nothing from this evidence as to whether it would be possible to have an industrialized society in which one or another link in the explanatory chain is broken-a society with a less pronounced system of social stratification; a society in which social-stratification position is not so intimately linked with opportunities for occupational self-direction; even a society where occupational self-direction has less impact on personality.5 Nevertheless, the Polish and Japanese studies do tell us that in decidedly diverse societies-arguably, in all industrialized societies-social stratification is associated with values, social orientations, and cognitive functioning, in large part because people of higher position have greater opportunity to be selfdirected in their work.
Whether or not this interpretation is correct, it does illustrate my central point: Where one finds cross-national similarities, then the explanation need not, indeed should not, be focused on the particular histories, cultures, or political or economic circumstances of each of the countries, but instead should focus on socialstructural regularities common to them all.
In studying social stratification, I am of course dealing with a feature of social structure that is notably similar in all industrialized societies (Treiman, 1977) . I would like to extend the argument a bit, to suggest that even where some feature of social structure is not "identical" in all the countries being compared, but only "equivalent," it is still possible to find cross-nationally consistent relationships between contemporaneous social structure and personality. More than that, it is still appropriate to interpret these consistent relationships in terms of contemporaneous social structure, however much that feature of social structure has been shaped by the particular histories and cultures of those countries.
My illustration here comes from our analysis of position in the class structure and personality in the United States, Japan, and Poland (Kohn et al. 1987 ). For all three countries, we have adapted the same basic idea-that social classes are to be distinguished in terms of ownership and control of the means of production, and control over the labor power of others-to the particular historical, cultural, economic, and political circumstances of the country. (For Poland, where ownership of the means of production is not a primary desideratum of class, control over the means of production and over the labor power of others is our primary criterion of class position.) The guiding hypothesis is that social class would bear a similar relationship to personality as does social stratification. Hence, we hypothesized that, in all three countries, those who are more advantageously situated in the class structure are more selfdirected in their values and orientations, and are more intellectually flexible, than are those who are less advantageously situated. Our further hypothesis, again paralleling what we have learned for social stratification, is that, in all three countries, the explanation lies mainly in the greater opportunities for occupational selfdirection enjoyed by those who are more advantaged in class position. The hypotheses, then, are simple extrapolations to social class from what we have consistently found to be the psychological impact of social stratification; the new element is the much greater country-tocountry variability of class structures than of stratification systems.
Both hypotheses are confirmed. All three countries can be meaningfully thought to have class structures; class position has similar effects on cognitive functioning, values, and orientation in all three countries; and class affects these facets of psychological functioning for essentially the same reason-because of the intimate relationship between position in the class structure and opportunities afforded for occupational self-direction. Hence, to extrapolate, it is no bar to structural interpretation that social structures have been shaped by distinctly different historical processes.
Cross-national Differences
Interpreting differences, as I said earlier, is where things become much less certain and much more difficult. The key, of course, is the truism that if consistent findings have to be interpreted in terms of what is common to the countries studied, then inconsistent findings have to be interpreted in terms of how the countries-or the studies-differ. This truism, unfortunately, gives no clue as to which of the many differences between countries or between studies lies at the heart of the differences in findings. Prudence dictates that the first hypothesis one entertains is that the inconsistent findings are somehow a methodological artifact. As Bernard Finifter noted: 'Michael Burawoy's (1979, p. 13) warning is pertinent, even though our research transcends capitalist society: "By taking the particular experiences of capitalist society and shaping them into universal experiences, sociology becomes incapable of conceiving of a fundamentally different type of society in the future; history is endowed with a teleology whose realization is the present."
There is a curious inconsistency in the way researchers interpret results from attempted replications when discrepancies crop up. Failure to reproduce a finding in the same culture usually leads the investigator to question the reliability, validity, and comparability of the research procedures used in the two studies for possible method artifacts. But failure to corroborate the same finding in a different culture often leads to claims of having discovered "cultural" differences, and substantive interpretations are promptly devised to account for the apparent differences. The issue is so complex that a thorough treatment would require quite another essay. In this essay, instead, I simply assume equivalence of concepts and go on to consider more mundane methodological differences.
In principle, methodological differences between studies could produce either consistent or inconsistent findings (Finifter 1977) . Still, when one finds cross-national similarities despite differences in research design, even despite defects in some of the studies, it is unlikely that the similar findings were actually produced by the methodological differences. Substantive similarity in the face of methodological dissimilarity might even argue for the robustness of the findings. But when one finds cross-national differences, then dissimilarities and defects in research design make for an interpretive quagmire-there is no way to be certain whether the apparent cross-national differences are real or artifactual.
It can be terribly perplexing not to know whether an apparent cross-national difference is merely a methodological artifact. I know, for example, of two studies of the interrelationship of social stratification, occupational selfdirection, and personality in less than fully industrialized societies, neither of which shows the pattern that has been consistently found in fully industrialized societies. One study was conducted in Taiwan before that island became as industrialized as it is today (Stephen Olsen 1971), the other in Peru (Scurrah and Montalvo 1975) . In Taiwan, the relationship between social stratification and parental valuation of self-direction was essentially the same as has been found in more industrialized societies, but occupational self-direction fails to explain this relationship. In Peru, the correlations of social stratification with such aspects of personality as fatalism, trust, and anxiety are similar to those found in more industrialized societies, but occupational self-direction explains only a modest portion of these correlations.
Should we therefore restrict the interpretation that occupational self-direction is of central importance for explaining the psychological impact of social stratification to apply only to fully industrialized societies? Perhaps we should, and one can readily think of reasons why the interpretation might not apply to partially industrialized societies-for example, the link between social stratification and occupational self-direction may be weaker in such societies. But, since neither the Taiwan nor the Peru study is truly comparable to those done in industrialized societies (see the discussion in Kohn and Schooler 1983, pp. 293-94), the issue is very much in doubt. The Taiwan and Peru studies leave us in a quandary: They raise doubts as to whether the interpretation does apply to partially industrialized societies, but they do not provide convincing evidence that it does not.
To obviate the possibility that differences in findings are merely an artifact of differences in method-in the nature of the samples, in the meaning of the questions asked, in the completeness of data, in measurement-one tries to design the studies to be comparable, to establish both linguistic and conceptual equivalence in questions and in coding answers, and to establish truly equivalent indices of the underlying concepts (Scheuch 1968 Kuechler 1986 ). Therefore, I do not discuss these issues further here. Instead, I assume comparability of methods (as well as comparability of concepts) and go on to the equally perplexing substantive issues in interpreting cross-national differences.
Substantive interpretations of cross-national differences. Finding a cross-national difference often requires that we curtail the scope of an interpretation, by limiting our generalizations to exclude implicated variables or relationships or types of countries from a more encompassing generalization. Ultimately, though, we want to include the discrepant findings in a more comprehensive interpretation by reformulating the interpretation on a more general level that accounts for both similarities and differences. Thus, although the discovery of cross-national differences may initially require that we make a less sweeping interpretation, in time and with thought, it can lead to more general and more powerful interpretations.
I wish that I could offer from my research an example of a powerful reinterpretation derived from coming to terms with cross-national differences. Instead, I can only share with you my dilemma in still not fully understanding some differences that I have been struggling to understand for some years. I may not convince you that discovering cross-national differences necessarily leads to new understanding, but I shall certainly convince you that the discovery of such differences forces one to question generalizations made on the basis of studying only one country. To illustrate, I use the most perplexing cross-national inconsistencies that we have found in the U.S .-Polish-Japanese comparisons (Kohn et al. 1987) .
Quite in contrast to our consistent findings about the relationship of social stratification to other facets of personality, we have found a decided inconsistency in the relationship between social stratification and a principal underlying dimension of orientations to self and others-a sense of well being versus distress. In the United States, higher stratification position decreases feelings of distress; in Japan, there is virtually no relationship between social stratification and feelings of distress; and in Poland, higher stratification position increases feelings of distress.6 The magnitude of the correlation is not great in any country, but the inconsistency in direction of relationship is striking. Similarly for social class: In the United States, members of more advantaged social classes, managers in particular, have a greater sense of well-being; members of less advantaged social classes, blue-collar workers in particular, have a greater sense of distress. In Poland, quite the opposite: It is the managers who are more distressed, the blue-collar workers who have a greater sense of well-being. In Japan, as in the United States, managers have a strong sense of well-being, but it is the white-collar-not the blue-collar-workers who are most distressed.
Why don't advantageous positions in the stratification and class systems have crossnationally consistent effects on the sense of distress? On one level, this question is readily answered: Our analyses show that stratification and class matter for psychological functioning primarily because people of more advantaged position have greater opportunity to be selfdirected in their work. But we find, in causal models of the reciprocal effects of occupational self-direction and distress, that although occupa-6 In our original comparative analysis of the United States and Poland (Slomczynski et al. 1981) , we put the issue somewhat differently: Social stratification has similar effects in the United States and Poland on all aspects of social orientation, but affects some aspects of self-conception differently. In particular, in the United States, higher stratification position is associated with greater self-confidence and less anxiety; in Poland, quite the opposite. "Social orientation" and "self-conception," however, are merely convenient rubrics; they are not underlying dimensions of orientation. Schooler and I (Kohn and Schooler 1982; 1983, Chapter 6) subsequently did a second-order confirmatory factor analysis of the several first-order dimensions of orientation, using U.S. data, to demonstrate that there are two underlying dimensions: self-directedness of orientation versus conformity to external authority, and a sense of well-being versus a sense of distress. Self-directedness of orientation implies the beliefs that one has the personal capacity to take responsibility for one's actions and that society is so constituted as to make self-direction possible. It is reflected in not having authoritarian conservative beliefs, in having personally responsible standards of morality, in being trustful of others, in not being self-deprecatory, in not being conformist in one's ideas, and in not being fatalistic. Distress is reflected in anxiety, selfdeprecation, lack of self-confidence, nonconformity in one's ideas, and distrust. We have since shown that these same two dimensions underlie the several facets of orientation in Poland and in Japan (Kohn et al. 1987 ). The basic parameters of the Polish and Japanese models, in particular the relationships between second-order and first-order factors, are quite similar to those for the U.S. model. In all three countries, there is a strong positive relationship between social stratification and selfdirectedness of orientation. The relationship between social stratification and the sense of distress, however, is neither strong nor cross-nationally consistent: the correlations are -0.18 for the United States, -0.01 for Japan, and + 0.15 for Poland. tional self-direction has a statistically significant effect (negative, of course) on the sense of distress for the United States and Japan, it has no effect at all for Poland. This is in marked contrast to the cross-nationally consistent effects of occupational self-direction on intellectual flexibility, values, and self-directedness of orientation. One can, in fact, incorporate the cross-national inconsistency into an encompassing generalization: Where occupational selfdirection has cross-nationally consistent effects on psychological functioning, so too do social stratification and social class; where occupational self-direction fails to have consistent effects, stratification and class also have inconsistent effects.
Oin another level, though, the question persists: Whyt doesn't occupational self-direction mitigate against distress in Poland, as it does in the United States and Japan? Moreover, occupational self-direction does not provide as effective an explanation of the relationships of stratification and class with distress in any of the three countries as it does for their relationships with other facets of personality in all three countries. Given the rather substantial effect of occupational self-direction on distress for the United States, we might well expect a higher correlation of social stratification with distress than the -0. 18 that we actually do find. We should certainly expect a higher correlation than the -0.01 that we actually do find for Japan. We should expect no relationship, not a positive relationship, for Poland. Clearly, more than occupational self-direction is involved in explaining the relationships of stratification and class to distress. My formulation, which implies that occupational self-direction, and therefore also stratification and class, would have an impact on feelings of distress consistent with its impact on values, self-directedness of orientation, and cognitive functioning, must be revised.
It is not at all certain from the evidence at hand, though, whether the interpretation requires minor revision or extensive overhaul. I am reasonably certain that the cross-national differences are not merely a methodological artifact, for example in the conceptualization or measurement of distress. In particular, the cross-national differences are found, not only in analyses using the "higher-order" concept, distress, but also in analyses using the "firstorder" concepts, notably self-confidence and anxiety (see note 6). The issues are substantive, not methodological.
In any reformulation, it is essential that we not lose sight of the fundamental principle that any explanation of cross-national differences must also be consistent with the cross-national similarities. To be valid, any explanation has to explain why we find cross-national inconsistencies only for the sense of distress, not for values, for self-directedness of orientation, or for cognitive functioning. Explanations so broadly framed as to lead one to expect Polish or Japanese men of more advantaged position to value conformity for their children, to have a conformist orientation to self and society, or not to be intellectually flexible, could not be valid. Nor would it make any sense to explain the findings in terms of a weaker linkage of social stratification or of social class to occupational self-direction in Poland or in Japan than in the United States, or in terms of occupational self-direction being any less important for Polish or Japanese men than for U.S. men.
As I see it, there are at least five ways that my interpretation might be reformulated:
The simplest reformulation would be to limit the scope of the interpretation to exclude the sense of distress; for as-yet unknown reasons, an interpretation that does apply to cognitive functioning, values, and self-directedness of orientation seems not to apply to the affective realm. This reformulation simply curtails the scope of my interpretation, until such time as we are able to develop a more general interpretation that incorporates cross-national differences along with cross-national similarities.
A second type of reformulation would posit that the psychological mechanisms by which job conditions affect distress may be different from those by which job conditions affect cognitive functioning, values, and self-directedness of orientation. Such a reformulation might or might not emphasize job conditions different from those that I have emphasized; it certainly would posit different processes by which job conditions affect personality. Mine is a learninggeneralization model: People learn from their job experiences and apply those lessons to non-occupational realms of life (Kohn 1985) . One could argue that the inconsistent effects of occupational self-direction on the sense of distress raise questions as to whether a learninggeneralization model applies to this facet of personality. Perhaps, instead, one should employ some other model of psychological process-a "stress" model is the obvious candidate-for understanding the effects of job on the sense of distress. The "stress" model posits that job conditions affect personality, in whole or in part, because they induce feelings of stress, which in turn have longer-term, off-the-job psychological consequences, such as anxiety and distress. Clearly, "stress" is a plausible link from job conditions to distress. But I think the evidence for a "stress" model, even when applied only to anxiety and distress, is less than compelling (Kohn 1985) ; moreover, positing different mechanisms for different facets of personality would be, at best, inelegant.
A related possibility, one that is much more to my liking, retains the learning-generalization model but expands the range of pertinent job conditions. This reformulation begins with the U.S. finding that job conditions other than those directly involved in occupational self-direction are more important for distress than for other facets of personality (Kohn and Schooler 1982; , Chapter 6). Some of these job conditions are related to stratification and class, hence might explain the effects-or lack of effectsof stratification and class on distress. The crux of this reformulation is the hypothesis that the effects of these other job conditions on distress may be at odds with, and perhaps more important than, those of occupational selfdirection. We have some pertinent, albeit limited, evidence that lends credence to this possibility (Kohn et al. 1987 ). In the United States, for example, job protections (such as seniority provisions in union contracts) mitigate against distress. Nonetheless, the very people who at the time of our interviews enjoyed the greatest job protections-the blue-collar workers-were also the most distressed. Blue-collar workers were distressed because they lacked opportunities for occupational self-direction and despite the job protections that many of them, particularly union members, enjoyed. Occupational self-direction and job protections seem to have countervailing effects, which may account for the relatively modest relationships of both social stratification and social class with distress, even in the United States.
For Japan, we find that believing that one works under considerable pressure of time, and believing that people in one's occupation are at risk of being held responsible for things outside of their control, are both related to distress. Although these findings may merely reflect a propensity of distressed people to overestimate the pressures and uncertainties of their jobs, it is at least a plausible hypothesis that such job conditions do increase distress. Our causal models suggest as well that either education itself, or job conditions related to education, increases distress. The countervailing effects of occupational self-direction, education, and other job conditions correlated with them both, may help explain why stratification and class have so little net effect on distress in Japan.
For Poland, we lack information about job conditions other than those directly pertinent to occupational self-direction. We do, however, have one fascinating bit of information that may help explain what it is about the conditions of life experienced by Polish managers that makes them more distressed than members of other social classes, quite in contrast to the situation of managers in the United States and Japan. We find that one segment of the Polish managerial class is particularly distressed-those managers who are not members of the Polish United Workers (Communist) Party. There are too few non-Party managers for this finding to be definitive, but I think it suggestive that the non-Party managers have decidedly higher levels of distress, compared not only to managers who are members of the Party, but also compared to members of any other social class, Party members or not. The implication, I think, is that being a non-Party manager in the Polish system of centralized planning entails uncertainties, risks, and insecurities greater than those experienced by managers who are members of the Party, and greater than those experienced by managers in the less centralized systems of capitalist countries. The Polish system may hold these managers responsible for accomplishments they have neither the leeway nor the resources to achieve. By the same token, the U.S. and Japanese systems may lead managers to feel more in control of the conditions of their lives than they really are.
Our evidence suggests, then, that not only does occupational self-direction fail to have the cross-nationally consistent effect on distress that it has on other facets of psychological functioning, but also, that other job conditions associated with stratification and class may have countervailing effects. What is lacking is adequate information about these other job conditions.
A fourth type of reformulation would take greater account of the processes by which people attain their occupational positions and of the meaning these positions have to them. Slomczynski, Miller, and Kohn (1981) speculated at length about the implications of post-World War II historical developments that resulted in differences between the United States and Poland in structural mobility, job-selection processes, and the symbolic importance attached to class position-differences that might explain why social stratification bears a different relationship to distress in the two countries. These speculations still seem to me to be plausible and they are certainly potentially testable. One could similarly point to differences between Japan and the West in the structure of industry, particularly in the sharper division in Japan between primary and secondary sectors of the economy, that might be pertinent to explaining why stratification has so little relationship to distress in Japan, and why Japanese white-collar workers are more distressed than are members of other social classes.
Finally, one could broaden the scope of the interpretation even more, by taking account of conditions of life other than those involved in job and career. It might be, for example, that cross-national differences in family structure, or in religious belief, or in whether the urban population is primarily rural in origin, or in "national culture" bear on the sense of distress. The pivotal questions, though, are not whether family, religion, rural origins, or culture account for differences in Polish, Japanese, and American men's sense of distress, but whether such non-occupational conditions help explain why social stratification and social class bear different relationships to the sense of distress in Poland, Japan, and the United States.
We do not have the evidence to test any of these interpretations. Each type of reformulation (other than simply limiting the scope of the interpretation to exclude distress) would require a different type of data. To test a "stress" formulation would require more information about the relationship between objective job conditions and the subjective sense of "stress" in one's work, and about the relationship between job stress and off-the-job distress. Similarly, to test any other model of psychological process would require data directly pertinent to that formulation. To test the hypothesis that job conditions other than those involved in occupational self-direction help explain the relationships of social stratification and social class to distress would require that we obtain much fuller information in all three countries about those job conditions thought to be productive of a sense of distress. To test the hypothesis that different processes of educational and occupational attainment account for the differential effects of stratification and class on the sense of distress would require information of yet another type: historical information about the impact of changes in the educational and occupational structures of Poland, Japan, and the United States since World War II as they impinged on particular cohorts of Polish, Japanese, and American workers. And then, finally, to test the rather vaguely formulated hypothesis that non-job conditions explain the cross-nationally inconsistent relationships of both class and stratification with distress would require information about the interrelationship of stratification and class with these other lines of social and cultural demarcation, in all three countries.
In any case, on the basis of presently available evidence, I still do not have a fully adequate explanation of why social stratification and social class have cross-nationally inconsistent effects on the sense of distress. 
SOME GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
I can now address some more general issues about cross-national research that I deliberately deferred until I had offered some concrete examples. These remarks are primarily addressed to research in which nation is treated as context.
1. In whose interest is cross-national research? This seemingly innocuous question contains a range of serious ethical and professional issues. At its worst, as in the infamous Camelot affair (Horowitz 1967 ), cross-national research has been used in the service of political oppression. In a less dramatic way, crossnational research has too often been a mechanism by which scholars from affluent countries have employed scholars in less affluent countries as data-gatherers, to secure information to be processed, analyzed, and published elsewhere, with little benefit either in training or in professional recognition for those who collected the data (Portes 1975; Scheuch 1967 ). These are complex issues, where surface appearances may be misleading. But, certainly, the history of cross-national research has not been entirely benign.
Past sins and mistakes notwithstanding, crossnational research need not be employed in the service of academic or other imperialisms. My own research is again illustrative. As a matter of historical record, it was not I but Wlodzimierz Wesolowski (1975, p. 98) who proposed the Polish-U.S. comparative study. He did so for precisely the same reason I found the prospect so attractive when he suggested it to me: to see whether the U.S. findings would apply to a socialist society. The study was funded and carried out by the Polish Academy of Sciences, who thought the issues important for Polish sociology and Polish society. The extension of the U.S.-Polish comparison to encompass Japan came about because Ken'ichi Tominaga, his Japanese colleagues, and the Japanese universities and foundations that funded this research were as interested as were the Americans and the Poles in seeing whether these phenomena are similar in that non-Western society.
The opportunities for genuine cross-national collaboration today, when there is a thriving, highly professional sociology in many parts of the world, are much greater than they were only a few years ago. Today it is quite possible, and advantageous for all concerned, for sociologists of many countries to collaborate effectively. The theoretical and policy issues to be addressed in cross-national research can be-in principle, ought to be-equally important for sociologists of all the countries concerned.
2. Is cross-national research distinctly different from research that compares social classes, or ethnic groups, or genders in a single country? I see cross-national research as one type of comparative research. In many discussions, though (see, for example, Armer and Grimshaw 1973), the term "comparative research" is treated as synonymous with crossnational research, as if the only possible comparison were inter-national comparison; this I regard as hubris on the part of the internationalists. In other discussions (e.g., Hopkins and Wallerstein 1967) the term "comparative" is used more broadly and "cross-national" is limited to what I consider to be only one type of cross-national research, transnational research. And in still other discussions (e.g., Ragin 1982), comparative research is seen as that particular type of cross-national research where " society" is used as the explanatory unit.7 These varying usages seem to me to impede meaningful discourse. I think it best to use the commonsense meanings of both "comparative" and "cross-national. "
My own research shows that cross-national research is no different in principle from other comparative research, although in practice it is likely to be more complex, especially as one tries to interpret cross-national inconsistencies. What makes it worth distinguishing crossnational research from other types of comparative research is that a much broader range of comparisons can be made: comparisons of political and economic systems, of cultures, and of social structures. Any comparisons we make within a single country are necessarily limited to the one set of political, economic, cultural, and historical contexts represented by that particular country. I simply cannot imagine any study of the psychological impact of class and stratification, done entirely within the United States, that could have extended the scope of our knowledge, or the power of our interpretation, as greatly as did the Polish and Japanese studies.
3. Why put the emphasis on cross-national? Why not cross-cultural or cross-societal or cross-systemic? Doesn't the term cross-national ascribe a greater importance to the nation-state than it deserves? I use the term cross-national mainly because nation has a relatively unambiguous meaning. Cross-cultural can mean anything from comparing subcultures within a single nation, for example, comparing MexicanAmerican and Anglo-American subcultures in the Southwest region of the United States, to comparing very large groupings of nations that share broadly similar cultures, as in William Goode's (1963) comparative analyses of historical changes in family patterns in "the West," Arabic Islam, Sub-Saharan Africa, India, China, and Japan. Similarly, as Charles Tilly (1984) cogently argues, it is extremely' difficult to define what is a "society." And the term cross-systemic is so vague as to have little research utility.
I do not think that this usage of nation necessarily implies anything about the importance of nation, or the nation-state, as such, any more than cross-cultural implies (or, at any rate, should imply) that culture is the explanatory desideratum. Furthermore, we learn something about the importance or lack of importance of the nation-state by discovering which processes transcend national boundaries and which processes are idiosyncratic to particular nations or to particular types of nations. In choosing which nations to compare, sometimes we do mean to compare nation-states; how could Theda Skocpol (1979) This flexibility, it must be recognized, comes at a price: When one finds cross-national differences, it may not be clear whether the crucial "context" that accounts for the differences is nation or culture or political or economic system (Scheuch 1967) . Still, one can at least try to assess which of these contexts might logically be pertinent to explaining a particular cross-national difference. And, for many types of research, one can then proceed to design new studies to differentiate among the contexts.
4. How many nations are needed for rigorous cross-national analysis, and how should they be chosen? For some purposes, particularly when using secondary data to establish cross-national 7 The issues in distinguishing cross-national research from other comparative research are discussed thoughtfully and at length by Grimshaw (1973) , who, inter alia, reviews and summarizes pertinent earlier discussions by Erwin Scheuch and Neil Smelser. See also Marsh (1967) and Zelditch (1971) . generalities, it is desirable to include all countries for which pertinent data can be secured. Thus, Alex Inkeles's pioneering paper, "Industrial Man," (1960) gained considerably from its demonstration that the relationship between social stratification and many facets of values and beliefs is consistent for a wide array of countries. Seymour Martin Lipset's argument in "Democracy and Working Class Authoritarianism" (1959) , that the working class is more "liberal" than the middle class on economic issues, but illiberal on issues of civil liberties and civil rights, was the more forceful because he marshalled evidence from several countries. Yet, it is expensive, difficult, and timeconsuming to collect data in many countries. We are rarely able to collect reliable data about enough nations for rigorous statistical analysis. Nor are we ordinarily able to study many countries in sufficient depth for intensive comparison. It is not necessarily true that the more nations included in the analysis, the more we learn. There is usually a tradeoff between number of countries studied and amount of information obtained. In this tradeoff, investigators can certainly disagree about the relative importance of number of countries and depth of information. And the same investigator might make different choices for different substantive problems. By and large, though, I would opt for fewer countries, more information.
My own preferred strategy is the deliberate choice of a small number of nations that provide maximum leverage for testing theoretical issues. One may begin with a study in one country, with subsequent extensions of the inquiry to other countries, as my collaborators and I have done in using Poland to learn whether U.S. findings are applicable to a socialist society and Japan to learn whether such findings apply to a non-Western, industrialized society. Alternatively, one can select pivotal countries that provide maximum opportunity to test some general hypothesis, as Theda Skocpol (1979) did in selecting France, Russia, and China for her study of the causes and consequences of social revolutions, or as John Walton (1984) Later, when we had solid evidence about the generality of our findings in Western, capitalist societies, studies in Poland and Japan became especially useful. The issue was no longer Washington's atypicality, but whether the relationships among social stratification, job conditions, and psychological functioning were peculiar to capitalist society or to Western society. Here, again, we could have chosen other countries that might have served our purposes as well: perhaps Hungary instead of Poland, or if it had been possible to do such research, there at that time, the Soviet Union; perhaps South Korea instead of Japan. It is often the case that no one country is uniquely appropriate for cross-national comparison. Other considerations-research feasibility, the availability of potential collaborators, funding, happenstance-may then legitimately enter in.
Were I to embark on a new comparative study today, the considerations would again be different, mainly because of what we now know from the Polish and Japanese studies, and because of new interpretive problems that have arisen from these studies. It would now be useful to study another socialist country and another non-Western industrialized country. It would also be useful to study a less than fully industrialized country, I think preferably (for the nonce) a capitalist country with a predominantly Western culture, perhaps a Latin American country. The possibilities for fruitful comparison do not shrink as one learns more, but actually grow.
The choice of countries should always be determined by asking whether comparing these particular countries will shed enough light on important theoretical issues to be worth the investment of time and resources that crossnational research will certainly require (Galtung 1967 (Hill 1962; Sarapata 1985) . Both the greatest benefits and the most difficult problems of cross-national research come from the collaborative relationships. If a good collaboration is like a good marriage, rewarding yet difficult, then a good cross-national collaboration is akin to a crosscultural marriage that manages to succeed despite the spouses living much of the time in different countries, sometimes with considerable uncertainty about passports, visas, and the reliability and timeliness of mail delivery, and despite working in different institutional settings with conflicting demands and rewards. And still, it's far preferable to the alternatives. More than that, without good collaboration, many types of cross-national research are simply not possible.
The methodological pitfalls are another set of obstacles to good cross-national research; I have touched on some of them earlier in this essay. It would be hard to exaggerate the amount of time, thought, and analysis that must go into the effort 8 A corollary is that, if one wants to gamble audaciously, do so where the payoff will be considerable. A splendid example is provided by Nancy Olsen (1974). She not only extended to Taiwan the scope of our U.S. findings about the relationship between closeness of supervision and parents' values for their children, but also extended the scope of generalization about the institution in which close supervision is experienced, from paid employment to the family itself. to achieve comparability of methods, concepts, and indices. There are also issues in the standards of research employed in different countries. Sometimes these issues become acutely problematic when one least expects them. As a simple yet telling example: The reason why we do not have Polish data about some of the job conditions that may be pertinent to distress is that the survey research specialists at the Polish Academy of Sciences refused to include questions about job conditions that did not meet their criteria of objectivity in a survey for which they were professionally responsible. Even when we appealed to them that crossnational comparability required their repeating the defects of the earlier U.S. study, they would not yield. They were as zealous in imposing their justifiable, yet irrelevant professional standards as were the clearance officers of the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and of the Office of Management and the Budget, in imposing their not nearly so justifiable requirements.
And still, there are yet more difficult problems, problems of interpretation. Particularly when one finds cross-national differences, an expert knowledge of all the countries is essential-a knowledge most easily achieved, of course, by collaborators who have expert knowledge of their own countries (see Kuechler 1986) . Even when such collaboration exists, though, sharing knowledge, interpreting within a common framework, even having enough time together to think things through at the crucial junctures, does not come easily.
Unless one has a good reason why research should be cross-national, it generally isn't worth the effort of making it cross-national. Operationally, this means that one should do crossnational research either when a phenomenon cannot be studied in just one country (for example, the causes of revolutions) or else when some phenomenon has been well substantiated in one country and the next logical questions have to do with the limits of generality of what has been learned. In principle, but rarely in practice, it may be worth embarking on a cross-national study of a less well researched problem if you have good a priori reason to believe that important theoretical issues can be more effectively addressed by conducting the research in more than one country. I remain a strong proponent of cross-national research, but I would not wish to mislead anyone into thinking that its very considerable advantages do not come at equally considerable cost. As I have argued throughout this essay, the interpretation of cross-national similarities should not focus on the unique historical experiences of each of the countries. One seeks to discover, instead, social-structural regularities that transcend the many differences in history, culture, and experience that occur among nations. This is true even in inquiries-Walton's (1984) Reluctant Rebels is a good example-where the evidence is mainly historical but the analysis searches, not for historical idiosyncrasies, but for historical commonalities. The intent in all analyses of cross-national similarities is to develop generalizations that transcend particular historical experiences in a search for more general explanatory principles. In short, the method may be historical, the interpretation should be sociological.
In a broader sense of history, of course, cross-national analysis, just as any other type of sociological analysis, cannot be ahistoric, even when much about history is only implicit in the interpretation (Sztompka 1986) . To compare the impact of social stratification on personality in the United States and Poland, for example, assumes that we are comparing industrialized states that have shared much of Western history. I The methodological debate takes place on two levels: the type of analysis used within each nation and the type of analysis used for comparing nations. I see nothing of value in the first part of the debate; one uses whatever methods are appropriate to the task. The second part of the debate deals with real issues, for example, the meaningfulness of using "samples" of nations, the utility of statistical tests when basing one's analysis on the entire set of existing countries, and the difficulties of having to test multiple interactions on a necessarily small number of "cases" (see, e.g., Ragin 1982 ). This literature, despite its antiquantitative bias, offers some useful cautions.
That one is a capitalist state and the other a socialist state can be viewed, depending on how you read the broad sweep of history, as a comparison of different economic-political systems or as a comparison of different levels of political development. In either case, even though history is not treated explicitly, historical considerations are certainly there implicitly. And when one compares fully industrialized to partially industrialized societies, historical issues are necessarily at least implicit. Nevertheless, in interpreting cross-national similarities, history need not be at the forefront of attention.
In interpreting cross-national differences, by contrast, historical considerations cannot be merely implicit; history must come to the forefront of any interpretation. For example, after demonstrating remarkable parallels in both the causes and consequences of the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions, Skocpol (1979) had to explain differences, particularly in revolutionary outcomes, in terms of historically unique circumstances. Similarly, when I find that social stratification and social class do not have the same impact on the sense of distress in the United States, Poland, and Japan, I have to look to the separate historical developments of the three countries, to try to discover what may explain the inconsistent findings. I maintain, though, that even in interpreting cross-national differences, explanation cannot consist merely in explicating pertinent historical differences. The object is not an understanding of history just for history's sake, but the use of history for understanding more general social processes. The interpretation must be historically informed, but sociological interpretations, even of crossnational differences, are quintessentially transhistorical.
EPILOGUE
In the preface to Class and Conformity, I made a declaration of faith: "The substance of social science knowledge comes from the process of speculation, testing, new speculation, new testing-the continuing process of using data to test ideas, developing new ideas from the data, doing new studies to test those ideas" (Kohn 1969 , p. xii). I take this occasion to re-affirm this fundamental tenet of my scientific faith. Its relevance to this essay is, I trust, obvious: In the process of speculating, testing, and speculating anew, cross-national research, properly employed, provides uniquely valuable evidence. There is no other evidence so useful for confirming social-structural interpretations, or for discovering their limitations. Either way, cross-national research is of pivotal importance for the development and testing of sociological theory.
